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This ‘polemical’ paper is concerned with ‘testing’ key elements of Elias’s theory of ‘civilis-
ing processes’ in a non-positivistic sense. More particularly, Elias’s undifferentiated con-
cept of violence is broken down into ten categories, some of which are then used to shed
light on war, genocide, crime, punishment and sport seen in long-term perspective. The work
of a range of authors who are more or less critical of Elias is next considered and the con-
clusion reached that, contrary to a common opinion, far from being falsified by their argu-
ments and evidence, Elias’s work is vindicated in most major respects. It, thus, represents
what he himself regarded as a breakthrough.
Keywords: affective (emotional) – rational violence scale; aggression; civilizing; de-civili-
zing and dys-civilizing processes; violence as play.
Resum. «Provant» Elias: aspectes de la violència en una perspectiva a llarg termini
Aquest article «polèmic» es dedica a «posar a prova» els elements centrals de la teoria dels
«processos de civilització» d’Elias en un sentit no positivista. Més concretament, el seu con-
cepte genèric de violència es divideix en deu categories, algunes de les quals ajuden a enten-
dre millor la guerra, el genocidi, el crim, el càstig i l’esport des d’una perspectiva a llarg
termini. La presa en consideració de l’obra per part d’una sèrie d’autors, poc o molt crítics
amb Elias, permet d’arribar a la conclusió que, en contra d’allò que s’ha dit sovint, les argu-
mentacions i les proves aportades no «falsen» en absolut l’obra d’Elias, sinó que en reivin-
diquen la validesa en la majoria dels seus aspectes centrals. Es constata, doncs, que les
aportacions d’Elias en relació a la violència permet un «trencament epistemològic» amb el
sentit comú en aquest àmbit.
Paraules clau: escala de violència afectiva (emocional) – racional; agressió; processos civi-
litzadors, des-civilitzadors i dis-civilitzadors; violència com a joc.
* I am grateful to Jason Hughes, Dominic Malcolm, Stuart Smith and Anne Witz for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Haude Saglam, a Leicester undergradu-
ate, also offered wise counsel regarding the concept of ‘genocide’.
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1. Introduction
This is a polemical paper. It is based mainly on secondary sources and divided
into what are in some respects only loosely related parts. In the first part, some
conceptual issues connected with the thorny problem of defining ‘violence’ and
the related term, ‘aggression’, are explored. In the second part, the discussion
becomes more concrete and involves a theoretical-empirical application of
some of the conceptual distinctions introduced in the first part, especially
those concerned with the affective dimensions of violence and the issue of
violence as play. More particularly, these distinctions are used to shed light on
aspects of the histories of war, ‘genocide’, violent crime, punishment, and
sport-and leisure-related violence1. Extensive use is made in this connection of
quotations from the secondary sources used. This is to enable readers to judge
for themselves whether or not the sources have been interpreted correctly.
It is important to insert two caveats at the beginning. The first is that,
whilst war, ‘genocide’, violent crime and sport have historically been mainly
male activities, females have sometimes been centrally involved as well. Lack
of space, however, precludes an exploration of the gender dimensions of
violence in this context2. The second caveat is that this list of activities may
seem to some people like a rag-bag which posesses a mixture of unrelated or
only partly related issues. I shall seek to show, however, that there are
similarities and perhaps connections between some of them which have not
always been recognised and which will become clearer if:
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1. An obvious omission from this collection of topics are the various forms of terrorism. A
case could also be made for discussing long-term changes in patterns of violence against
children. Indeed, mass media representations of violence and their effects perhaps also
ought to have been included.
2. Just to mention one horrifically infamous example, some 150 women were among the
guards at the Auschwitz death camp. One of them, Ilse Greser, was particularly noted for
her sadism and was hanged after the war.
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(i) The issues are viewed from a long-term perspective;
(ii) The emotional/affective levels and dimensions and not just the ratio-
nal/cognitive ones are explored;
(iii) The existence of what are for some kinds of people under specific conditions
playful and pleasurable forms of violence and aggression at the levels of both
fact and fantasy is acknowledged more explicitly than has often been done
by contributors to the field of violence studies in the past; and
(iv) The technological dimensions of violence and their social and psychological
ramifications as parts of a social field are explicitly brought out.
Throughout, the paper will be concerned with the implications of the issues
discussed for sociological theory, especially for Elias’s theory of ‘civilizing
processes’ (Elias, 1939; 2000). That theory and the basic premises on which it
rests will inform most of the discussion. Indeed, as the title implies, the paper
can be viewed as a ‘test’ of Elias’s theory in a non-positivistic sense. I shall begin
by looking at a deeply rooted contemporary belief.
2. A Deeply Rooted Contemporary Belief
It is widely believed that we are living today in one of history’s most violent
periods. Indeed, it is probably fair to say that, in Western societies at least, the
fear that we may be currently undergoing a process of ‘de-civilization’, above
all of mounting violence, is deeply imprinted in the contemporary Zeitgeist,
one of the dominant beliefs of our times. In the opening chapter of their recent-
ly published International Handbook of Violence Research (2003: 5), for exam-
ple, the editors Heitmeyer and Hagan wrote that: ‘In Western societies, the
dream of a non-violent modern age clashes with a reality that is massively over-
shadowed, if not totally plunged into darkness by overt acts of violence and
the potential for destruction …’ Consistently with this, the following was
reported in The Observer newspaper on Sunday 13 November 2005:
A culture of violence in Britain is to blame for an epidemic of school bully-
ing that is devastating the lives of millions of children, according to … one of
the country’s leading experts on young people. In his first major interview as
the new Children’s Commissioner for England, Al Aynsley Green … said: ‘I
have no doubt that children are being brought up in a society where violence
is the norm in many ways. I include in this the violence on television, in the
workplace and in the home.’
Similar beliefs have been around since at least the 1970s. For example, the
psychologists Eysenck and Nias wrote in 1978 of ‘a number of acknowledged
facts’ which, they claimed, ‘have helped to persuade many people that the
civilization in which we live may be in danger of being submerged under
a deluge of crime and violence’ (Eysenck and Nias, 1978: 17). From a
figurational standpoint, of course, ‘civilization’ is always faced potentially with
the danger of collapse. ‘Civilizing controls’ are learned and never more than a
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relatively thin shell. That is why figurational sociologists lay stress on
increasing the understanding, not only of ‘civilizing processes’, but of ‘de-
civilizing’ and ‘dys-civilizing’ processes as well3.
Arguing from a psychological perspective different from that of Eysenck
and Nias, Peter Marsh contended, also in the late 1970s, that then-recent
social developments in Britain had led to a decline in opportunities for ‘socially
constructive ritual violence’, what he called ‘aggro’,  with the consequence that
uncontrolled and destructive violence had increased. Using a variation on
Erich Fromm’s distinction between ‘benign’ and ‘malignant’ aggression
(Fromm, 1977), Marsh argued that there had taken place a ‘drift from “good”
violence into “bad” violence’. People, he said, are ‘about as aggressive as they
always were but aggression, as its expression becomes less orderly, has more
blood as its consequence’ (Marsh, 1978a: 142). How it is possible without
historical study to reach the conclusion that aggressiveness is an historically
fixed quantum is something that Marsh fails to tell us. Clearly he descended
with at least this aspect of his case from science into ideology.
A similar dose of scare-mongering ideology recurred in a judgement about
sport made by Australian journalist Don Atyeo in 1979. Atyeo detected strong
parallels between trends in modern sport and trends in their counterparts in
Ancient Rome. He argued that a self-destructive trend towards escalating
violence is occurring in modern sport, principally as a result of the demands
of sensation-seeking spectators. What he wrote remains one of the clearest
expressions of a still commonly held belief. It is, on that account, worth citing.
Atyeo expressed his apocalyptic vision thus:
The future of violent sports seems assured. Games will grow harder and
bloodier to feed the rising appetite of an audience which will grow increasingly
more jaded and satiated with violence, and increasingly more violent itself,
until, perhaps, something happens to bring it all crashing down. This time
around, though, the likelihood is that it won’t be the barbarian hordes banging
on the gates outside which will destroy the Coliseum. This time the violence
will be of sport’s own making and will come from within the walls of the
Coliseum itself (Atyeo, 1979: 377).
It will be one of my contentions in this paper that, while a worldwide trend
towards increasing violence is undoubtedly currently occurring both in sport
and elsewhere, diagnoses such as those of Eysenck, Nias, Marsh, Atyeo and
312 Papers, 2011, 96/2 Eric Dunning
3. The concept of a ‘de-civilizing process’ refers to a civilizing process that goes into reverse.
That of a ‘dys-civilizing process’ refers to a ‘’civilized’ regime which creates and maintains
compartments of destruction and barbarism in meticulous isolation, almost invisible and
well-nigh unmentionable. It is as if the civilizing process continues with the same means, but
with a different turn: in one word, it has become a dyscivilizing process.’ (de Swaan, 2003:141).
In short, this concept is designed to recognize the fact that state-formation does not necessarily
produce civilizing consequences and that state monopolies of violence can be used in the pur-
suit of ‘barbaric’, ‘uncivilized’ ends.
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Aynsley involve greater or lesser elements of sensationalism and exaggerate the
extent and seriousness of the trend to a greater or lesser degree. A discussion of
some conceptual and theoretical issues will hopefully help to prepare the way
for showing why that is the case.
3. Towards a Typology of Human Violence
The types of violence engaged in by humans are diverse and complex. De Haan
and Spierenburg have recently argued for approaches to the subject which see
‘violence’, respectively, as ‘an essentially contested concept’ (De Haan, 2005),
but one which should be restricted solely to ‘physical attacks’ and is probably not
applicable to non-human animals (Spierenburg, 2005). That residual elements
of metaphysical ‘mind-body’ dualism enter into both of their approaches can
arguably be seen from the fact that De Haan distinguishes in his conclusion
between ’physical’ and ‘non-physical’ violence, whilst Spierenburg tells us that
he is ‘pleading for a restrictive definition of violence, which essentially limits it
to the encroachment upon a person’s physical integrity’. Although both authors
would probably seek to deny it, arguably inherent in their approaches and
much modern thinking in this area is the idea that phenomena such as ‘verbal
violence’, ‘symbolic violence’ and ‘mental cruelty’ are somehow ‘non-physical’.
This raises the question of where they are supposed to reside? In a ‘realm of
spirit’? In ‘heaven’ as in Plato’s theory of forms? In the ether? Viewed
scientifically, of course, our so-called ‘minds’ and ‘emotions’ are functions of our
physical bodies. Moreover, physical processes are involved in the production and
hearing of sounds, and the ‘rational’ and ‘emotional’ experiences of individuals
are ‘embodied’ and therefore ‘physical’, too.
Although Elias used the concepts of violence and Gewalt in a general and
undifferentiated way, I want to suggest that a thoroughgoing application of
his process-sociological or figurational approach which is concerned with
dynamic balances, gradations and degrees and does not fall foul of ‘mind-body
dualism’ can help us to gain a greater purchase on the issues involved than is
possible through searching for a single, universal definition of violence or a nar-
row range of contested definitions. More particularly, a move towards a more
comprehensive understanding of violence will arguably be achievable if dis-
tinctions are drawn among separable forms and dimensions of violence in
terms of criteria such as the following:
(i) The means employed;
(ii) The actors’ motives and values;
(iii) The actors’ psychological states, especially their levels of psycho-physical
emotional arousal and the degrees of intentionality, rationality and con-
trol involved in their actions; and
(iv) The social parameters within which the violence takes place. These para-
meters include: the norms, value-dispositions and ideologies characteris-
tic of particular groups and which are operative in particular social set-
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tings; the size, character and degrees of integration and organization of
the social fields within which the violence occurs, and finally, the degree
to which an effective monopoly of physical force has been established at
a societal level. In the ‘real’, that is the experienced or empirical social
world, these analytically separable forms and dimensions of violence tend
to fuse and overlap. They are neither totally distinct nor ‘pure’. It follows
from this that, in most if not all cases, they are questions of gradations
or degrees rather than of simple dichotomies. Seen in these terms, at least
the following ten distinctions can be provisionally made among the forms
and dimensions of human violence:
1. Whether violence is ‘actual’/’real’ or ‘symbolic’, that is, whether it takes the
form of a direct and overt assault or simply takes a verbal form or a
gestural/facial posturing form which intentionally or unintentionally
increases the fear of the recipients or victims. It is worth noting that
physical assaults, e.g. in robberies or wars, are often accompanied by verbal
violence, shouting and/or screaming and contorted faces on the part of the
aggressors. Recurrently engage-in facial expressions can also become
embodied at the level of habitus as Elias showed in the case of medieval
warriors (Elias, 2000:161ff ). Of course, in such cases as terrorist bombings,
suicide bombings and forms of violent crime such as bank robberies, the
perpetrators usually have to exercise a high degree of self-control over their
own anxieties and to seek to mask their violent intentions until the
moment comes to strike. They are not, that is to say, usually noisily and
overtly physically aggressive. Violent physical assaults can also be
accompanied by the facial and other physio-psychological signs of pleasure
and arousal. The degree to which a physical and/or verbal assault is
experienced as violent also depends to some extent on the age, physique
and subjectivity of the victim(s). That is because people’s tolerance of
physical pain, verbal violence and anxiety varies from person to person and
through the life-course. For example, it seems reasonable to hypothesize
that, ceteris paribus, infants and old people and people who are otherwise
physically weak and/or have weak egos will tend to be more liable than
physically stronger, more self-confident people to experience verbal and not
only ‘physical’ onslaughts as painful, intrusive and destructive.
2. Whether the violence takes a ‘play’ or ‘mock’ form or whether it is ‘serious’
or ‘real’. This dimension clearly overlaps with dimension (1). It might also
be captured by the distinction between ‘ritual violence’ and ‘non-ritual
violence’ introduced by Peter Marsh and his colleagues (1978b), though it
has to be noted that, pace what they argue, ritual and play can both be
seriously violent in intent and content. Core football hooligans, for
example, the groups who Marsh et al had principally in mind, invariably
seek physically to hurt their opponents and not infrequently succeed.
3. Whether or not a weapon or weapons are used and where they are, the level
of technological knowledge and expertise that was involved in their
314 Papers, 2011, 96/2 Eric Dunning
Papers 96/2 (complert)_Papers  05/04/11  09:48  Página 314
manufacture, e.g. swords and bows and arrows in contrast to rocket-
propelled nuclear weapons.
4. Where weapons are used, whether or not the combatants come directly
into contact. Related to this dimension is the degree of physical distance
between combatants who are not in direct contact, and especially whether
they are able to see and/or hear each other or not.
5. Whether animals are involved in the violence either as targets/victims of the
human perpetrators or as trained helpers of the latter. In foxhunting, for
example, foxes are the targets/victims whilst hounds are the killers trained
by their human masters. Similarly in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern
warfare, horses and in some cases camels and elephants played a crucial part.
6. Whether the violence is planned and intentional or the accidental
consequence of an action sequence that was not intentionally violent at the
outset. For example, if pacifying gestures and language are not swiftly offered,
an accidental collision between two people walking along a street or playing
in a football match may spark a physically and verbally violent exchange.
7. Whether one is dealing with violence initiated without provocation or with
a retaliatory response to an intentionally or unintentionally violent act or
perhaps to a real or perceived insult, an aggressive facial expression or a
menacing bodily posture.
8. Whether the violence is legitimate in the sense of being in accordance with
a set of socially prescribed rules, norms and values, or whether it is non-
normative or illegitimate in the sense of involving the contravention of
accepted social standards. A subcategory of this dimension involves the
illegitimate use of violence by agents who have been officially licensed by
a state, e.g. the use of violence by police or military personnel in a
democratic state to obtain information or a confession.
8. Whether the violence takes a more ‘rational’ or a more ‘affective’ form, that
is whether it is rationally chosen as a means for helping to secure the
achievement of a given end or goal, or engaged in as an emotionally
arousing, pleasurable and satisfying ‘end in itself ’. Another way of
conceptualizing this dimension would be to distinguish between violence
in its more ‘instrumental’ and more ‘expressive’ forms.
9. Whilst violence can be inflicted by persons on themselves whether they are
alone or in company, most violence is directed at others and takes place in the
context of a social field characterized by chains or networks of interdependence
that vary in terms of their length, density, degrees of organization and the
balance within them between centripetal and centrifugal pressures4.
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4. Even when people are alone they are usually parts of a social field. They may, for example,
live on their own but have neighbours; or they may spend time on their own in their bed-
room but be in a house and neighbourhood with others. The only partial exceptions are
provided by people such as hermits who successfully manage completely to eschew the
company of others. Degrees of individualization/aloneness such as are involved in having
one’s own bedroom are, in fact, one of the variable properties of all social fields.
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Following Max Weber, some sociologists would call these distinctions ‘ideal
types’ but it is preferable from a figurational standpoint to conceptualize them
in terms of interconnected polarities and balances. Let me briefly discuss the
concept of aggression.
4. A Figurational ‘Take’ on the Concept of Aggression
‘Aggression’ is a term which comes out of psychology and it is possible to use
it in a constructive sense, whereas ‘violence’ is a popular term which is
invariably used with negative connotations. Examples  both of which I have
mentioned already are Fromm’s distinction between ‘benign’ and ‘malignant’
aggression and Marsh’s derivation of ‘aggro’ from ‘aggression’ to refer to
violence, e.g. that of football hooligans, that he regards as ritualized and socially
constructive. I am less concerned here about terminological niceties, though.
I want rather to discuss the idea of writers such as Freud (1932) and Lorenz
(1963) that humans have an ‘aggressive drive’ or ‘instinct’. Elias (1988) wrote
persuasively on this issue from a sociological and accordingly more reality-
congruent standpoint. The idea that humans have an innate aggressive drive
which structurally resembles the sex and hunger drives, Elias said, is a false way
of posing the problem. What we do have is an ‘innate potential to shift (our)
whole physical apparatus to a different gear if (we) feel endangered’. This is the
so-called ‘fight-flight mechanism’ through which the human body reacts to
danger by an automatic adjustment which prepares the way for ‘intensive
movement of the skeletal muscles, as in combat or flight’. According to Elias,
however, human ‘drives’ such as the hunger or sex drive are released
physiologically, ‘relatively independently of the actual situation’ in which
people find themselves. By contrast, the shifting of the body economy ‘to
combat-or flight-readiness is conditioned to a greater extent by a specific
situation whether present or remembered’. Such situations can be ‘natural’, for
example being attacked by a wild animal, or social, especially conflict5.
However, in conscious opposition to Freud, Lorenz and others who ascribe an
aggression drive to people on the model of the sex drive, it is not, said Elias,
‘aggressiveness’ that triggers conflicts but conflicts that ‘trigger aggressiveness’
(Elias in Keane, 1988:177-8).
There was, of course, a degree of rhetorical exaggeration in this. Elias
would not have denied that some conflicts result from the disruptiveness of
aggressive individuals. He also stressed the interdependence of different human
drives (Elias, 1939; 2000:161). In other words, he was aware of the
interconnectedness of the sex, hunger and thirst drives and aggression,
particularly if the former are frustrated. What he wanted above all to do was
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5. It is, of course ‘natural’ for humans to be ‘social’. That is to say, we evolved biologically as a
species that is dependent on social artefacts such as language and with built-in aids to sociabil-
ity such as smiling and laughing. Adults can, of course, learn to use smiling and laughing and lan-
guage as well in what we call ‘anti-social’ ways but these, too, are a variety of ‘social facts’.
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to counter the crude psychological reductionism involved in the notion of an
‘aggressive instinct’. Summing up, it was Elias’s contention that whether the
‘fight-flight mechanism’ is directed into fighting or fleeing is fundamentally a
question of culture and social learning. More particularly, it is a question of the
degree to which the values of the society or group into which one is born or
of which one later becomes a member, e.g. through immigration, lay stress on
the violent as opposed to the peaceful end of the continuum between
extremely violent and wholly peaceful means of handling tensions and
conflicts. Applying some of the sorts of conceptual distinctions I have been
discussing, let me now turn to the issue of war seen in long-term perspective.
5. Some Sociological Reflections
on Warfare Viewed in Long-term Perspective
I propose to examine four main arguments and issues in this context:
1. The argument put forward most explicitly in recent years by Hans Joas
(2003) that Elias’s theory of ‘civilizing processes’ is subject to two contra-
dictory interpretations;
2. The old contention which has resurfaced in sociology, anthropology and
archaeology since the in 1960s that it is misleading to write, as Elias does,
of ‘civilizing processes’ as involving ‘pacification’ because the opposite is
true. According to the supporters of this view, far from being conducive
to pacification, civilizations are one of the major causes, if not the major
cause of violence and war;
3. The more reality-congruent view of ‘primitive’ warfare, especially among the
native American Cheyenne, put forward by Bryan Turner (2003) in his
essay on ‘warrior charisma’, a context in which he also proposes a largely
constructive critique of Elias; and
4. The idea that the undoubtedly extreme violence of modern warfare also
refutes Elias’s theory.
6. Interpreting Elias: Hans Joas’s War and Modernity
Arguably in all respects save one, Hans Joas’s War and Modernity (2003) makes
important contributions to the field of violence studies. The exception relates
to his interpretation of Elias. Joas argues persuasively that ’war and violence are
parts of modernity and not just its prehistory’ (Joas: 43). This, of course, runs
counter to the belief of early sociological figures such as Comte and Spencer.
It is Joas’s contention further to this that the belief in modernity as peaceful
did not die with these so-called ’founding fathers’ but continues to be held
more or less explicitly by contemporary advocates of ’modernization theory’.
He writes:
Modernization theory first of all assumes more or less implicitly that
modernity is peaceful. The transition from violent struggle to a peaceful way
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of dealing with conflicts within societies has been essential to this definition of
modern societies. But not only the peaceful resolution of major conflicts
within states by way of non-violent political procedures is considered modern;
individual crime is also said to have changed from spontaneous acts of violence
to emotionally controlled forms, for example in property-related crimes6.
Norbert Elias’s theory of civilization, with its claim that an increase in the
control of the emotions has coincided with a growth in the complexity of
social relations is a case in point (Joas, 2003: 45).
This involves a common mis-representation of part of Elias’s case. What the
latter actually suggested on the basis of the comparative study of a substantial
body of cross-national data, is that, in the first instance, members of the secular
upper classes in what had become by the early twentieth century the dominant
societies of Western Europe — England, France and Germany — experienced
increasing social pressure to exercise stricter, more even and more continuous
self-control over their feelings and behaviour as their societies changed from
feudal states, through dynastic states into urban-industrial nation-states. Later
these pressures began to spread, more or less unevenly, down the social scale.
Joas goes on to signal that he is to some extent aware of the problematic nature
of the above aspect of his case by adding in a footnote that:
I am well aware of the fact that, contrary to my strong emphasis on the
linearity in Elias’s assumptions about an increasing complexity of social
relations and an increasing control of the emotions, there are interpretations
that focus on the international constellations and their contingency in Elias’s
work (Joas 2003: 202).
A focus on international constellations and ‘contingency’ in the sense of
‘blind processes’ the outcomes of which cannot, at least at the present level
of understanding, be predicted but which can be explained retrospectively was
always a part of Elias’s case (1978: 158ff; 2000: 436ff ). Any interpretation
which argues otherwise is simply wrong. Later in his main text, Joas changes
tack and informs us that Elias’s
[…] classical early work on the civilizing process had asserted a linear process
of the monopolization of violence and the increase of affectual control in the
structure of personality. However, his later work allows for a very different
interpretation since it moves in the direction of a reflexivity of the civilizing
process, the replacement of mere inner compulsion by responsibility and
reflexivity (Joas, 2003: 167).
It is entirely reasonable to suppose that Elias’s thinking would have
matured or at least changed as he grew older. However, if it did, any changes
which occurred after the initial publication of Über den Prozess der Zivilisation
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6. Joas is referring here to the work of whom? quién? aquí falta algo
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in 1939 were relatively marginal. Elias was in his 40s when he wrote that book,
so it was far from being a piece of ‘early’ or ‘youthful’ work in the sense that
Joas can be taken to imply. Moreover, the first and second accounts by Joas
cited above lack any reference to violence-control and state-formation, whilst
his third lacks any reference to ‘structural complexity’ or, more properly, to the
lengthening and growing density and complexity of interdependency chains.
Both  pacification under the aegis of increasingly powerful states, and the
correlative lengthening and growing density and complexity of chains of
interdependence which increasingly took on monetary as well as other forms
are held by Elias to have contributed powerfully to changes at the level of
‘personality structure’ (usually Habitus in Elias’s original German) that were
experienced as ‘civilizing’ and ‘rationalizing’ in the sense of involving growing
social pressure on people to exercise foresight and self-control. However, whilst
he thought of these ‘blind processes’ as unintentionally ‘directional’ in the
sense, for example, of involving changes towards greater or lesser levels of
‘civilization’ or greater or lesser levels of structural complexity, Elias did not
think of them as ‘linear’ and certainly not as ‘unilinear’, at least in any simple
and constantly ‘progressive’ sense. In the present context, it must be enough
to use a single example to show how that was so.
In The Civilizing Process, Elias wrote what he called an ’Excursus on Some
Differences in the Paths of Development of England, France and Germany’
(2000: 261-268). This seems not to have been noticed by commentators such
as Joas but is enough on its own to show that Elias thought in multilinear terms.
It is one of Elias’s contentions in this ‘Excursus’ that the large territory occupied
by the German-speaking peoples and the size and socio-cultural diversity of
their population led them to encounter greater difficulties regarding state-
centralization and unification than the English and the French, the sizes of
whose territories and populations were smaller. This led to stronger centrifugal
tendencies and a more discontinuous pattern of history and social development
in the German case. One consequence of this for what they originally called the
’Holy Roman’ or ’German Roman Empire’ (Reich) was that no ’court society’
such as emerged in France, and no ’great Society’ such as grew up in England
centred on London and parliament could arise and ‘courtize’, ‘tame’ and
’democratize’ the German aristocracy. As a result, for longer than the
aristocracies of France and England, the German aristocracy retained a
militaristic ethos. The latter also excluded the middle classes from their scattered
courts, ensuring that Germany’s middle class elites obtained little experience of
participation in the business of ruling. According to Elias, this was one of the
roots of the originally humanistic ethos of the German middle classes, groups
who became to a degree militarized themselves when the militaristic Prussians
succeeded in unifying the country nationally in the 1870s (Elias, 1996).
This discussion must be enough for present purposes to show that, pace
Joas, Elias’s thinking was already multilinear when he wrote Über den Prozess
der Zivilisation. Interestingly, Joas’s sociological perspective is in some ways
surprisingly close to that of Elias. Like Joas, the latter berated the dominant
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paradigms for their neglect of violence, war and international relations. Like
Joas, Elias was severely critical of ‘modernization’ theories. However, he went
further, questioning not only the adequacy of the concept of ‘modernization’
per se but also stressing the multilinear, multidimensional and multilevelled
character of long-term social processes. Both scholars also lay stress on the need
for a balance between ’commitment’/’involvement’ (Engagement) and
’detachment’ (Distanzierung) in sociological research and theory (Elias, 1987;
Joas, 2003: 85). Like Joas, moreover, Elias repeatedly referred to what the
former called ‘the historical blindness of many writings emanating from
empirical social research and the lack of theory in many historical analyses …’
(Joas, 2003: 89, Elias, 1969) The similarities and convergences by no means
end there. Let me turn now to a critical examination of what one might call
the ‘Rousseauian’ as opposed to the ‘Hobbesian’ view of primitive warfare.
7. The Myth of the ‘Peaceful Savage’
I referred earlier to an argument which has resurfaced in some sociological,
anthropological and archaeological circles in recent years. This is that it is
misleading to talk, as Elias does, of ‘civilizing processes’ as involving pacification.
According to the supporters of this view, far from being conducive to
pacification, civilizations and states are in fact one of the major causes of
violence and war if not the major causes. Elias, it is implied, takes a ’Hobbesian’
stance, whereas a ’Rousseauian’ standpoint is more ‘object-adequate’. According
to subscribers to the latter view, in the societies that present-day Westerners tend
to label as ’primitive’, ’savage’, or ‘uncivilized’, that is, the ’structurally simpler’,
’pre-literate’, ‘non-literate’, ’tribal’ or ’pre-state’ societies of yesterday and today
war is or was a non-existent, rare or trivial occurrence, a ritualized and quasi-
sport-like affair in which few people were hurt or lost their lives. American
sociologist William Sumner appears to have been one of the first to adopt such
a ‘Rousseauian’ stance. Thus he wrote in 1911 that ‘primitive man might be
described as a peaceful animal” who “dreads” war’ (cited in Keeley, 1996: 8).
More recently, such a view received powerful support from English social
psychologist, Peter Marsh, in the book Aggro (1978a) which I cited earlier. It is
a book in which he tells us about what he thinks is the character of warfare
among a warrior people, the Dani of New Guinea.
Marsh’s exposition of the ‘Rousseauian’ case is expressed with crystal clarity.
It is hence worth citing at length. The fact that the Dani think of themselves
as warriors, Marsh implies, adds strength to his case. Wars among the Dani are
frequent, he tells us, and they start in the morning with the warriors of one
tribe issuing a challenge to the warriors of another. Such challenges are usually
taken up but they will not be if the warriors think it is likely to rain or if there
is not time to eat the ritual sweet potatoes which are central to the Dani
warrior tradition.
When they do accept a challenge, the Dani warriors paint themselves and put
on their war head-dresses. Then, in a state of mounting excitement, they advance
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to the pre-arranged battleground. When they reach it, the two groups stop at a
distance from each other of some 500 yards. Then each advances in a stop-go
fashion until they are at a distance from each other of some 50 or so paces. At
this point, they throw their spears at each other and retreat. Arrows are fired as
well but they have no flights, a fact which Marsh construes as resulting, not from
technological ignorance but as a primitive form of arms control. Marsh also
likens the Dani warriors to present-day English football hooligans7.
According to Marsh, the death toll from a year of such fighting is usually
between 10 and 20 warriors on each side. ‘In tribes where fighting provides a
major focus of activities’, he writes, … ‘where battles are essential to the main-
tenance of their entire social fabric; more people die from the common cold than
from the spears and arrows of rival warriors’ (Marsh, 1978a: 49). ‘Evidence’
of this kind leads Marsh to reach the conclusion that it is misleading to talk
of ‘warfare’ among the New Guinea plains warriors because
… these battles are not warfare in the sense we know it today. They are more
like ‘skirmishes’ or ‘raids’ … Violence of this kind does not have the terrifying
rationality associated with the struggle for survival in a world of scarcity and
need. It arises as a solution to the problem of aggression, the thing which binds
together a tribe because it is directed outwards. By channelling the competitive
hostility outwards towards the tribe on the other side of the hill, social bonds
within one’s own group are reaffirmed and maintained. Demonstrations of
character on the battlefield are converted into the tangible rewards offered by
a community in which exhibitions of courage and solidarity are held in esteem.
The warrior finds favour within the dominance hierarchy that is firmly
sustained as part of the social fabric in which he lives out his life. The
framework may seem illogical but it works. And it copes more effectively
with the aggression of men than the seemingly more civilized social structures
we find in our own society. Aggression is recognised and managed  and that
is a rational approach (Marsh, 1978: 49, 50).
I am not totally opposed to the argument Marsh puts forward here. The
pattern of ‘in-group/out-group’, ‘we-group/they-group’ or ‘us/them’ bonding
(Elias, 1978) that he describes is a common pattern in societies at all levels of
social development (in the sense of levels of structural complexity). What I do
find problematic is how Marsh explicitly compares Dani warfare to modern
football hooliganism, arguing that both are socially constructive outlets for
male aggression. The supposedly ‘primitive’ Dani, Marsh implies, are wiser
than we are in the modern West because they recognize and manage aggression.
Westerners allegedly deny it and try to stamp it out, partly, Marsh argues, as
a result of feminist misunderstandings. What Marsh misses in this connection
is arguably twofold: (i) the fact that ‘primitive’ peoples  or better, the members
of structurally simpler societies  such as the Dani account for their warfare in
magical-mythical terms, i.e. in terms of gods and spirits, not rationally as
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Marsh implies; and (ii) he fails to appreciate that it is not football hooliganism
but sports such as football which, if the rules are followed and enforced, take
on the character of a mock-fight and which have developed in ‘modern’
societies as major means of channelling aggression8. Although it can contain
elements of ritual in Marsh’s sense, football hooliganism is a potentially
dangerous and destructive superimposition on what really do involve forms of
ritualized aggression, namely highly regulated ‘modern’ sports per se.
To my knowledge, one of the first to attempt to counter such a
Rousseauian view was the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski who wrote in
1941 that ‘anthropology has done more harm than good in confusing the issue
by … depicting human ancestry as living in a golden age of perpetual peace’
(cited in Keeley, 1996: 8). The data-based arguments of Wrangham and
Peterson (1997) and Keeley (1996), however, are considerably more damaging
to Marsh’s case than this or my own earlier suggestions. Wrangham and
Peterson, for example, cite a ‘global assessment’ of the ethnographies of 31
hunter-gatherer societies which found that ‘64% of them engaged in warfare
once every two years, 26% fought wars less often, and only 10% were
considered to fight wars rarely or never’ (Ember, 1978, cited in Wrangham and
Peterson [1997:75]). Wrangham and Peterson also inform us that:
Anthropologists have occasionally been able to gather statistics on warfare
among independent peoples uninhibited by intervention from more powerful
tribes or governments. Violence accounted for the deaths of about 19.5% of
adult men among the Huli of highland New Guinea; for the Mae Enga and
the Dugum Dani, also of highland New Guinea, warfare produced adult male
mortality rates of 25% and 28.5%, respectively. For the Murngin of Australia,
the figure was 28% (Chagnon, 1988: 986; and Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989: 417;
both cited in Wrangham and Peterson, 1997: 77).
As I suggested earlier, Lawrence Keeley’s arguments are also seriously
damaging to Marsh’s case. Keeley firstly argues that, while the loss of 20
people per year in war may seem a very small number to, for example, the
British who have a population of some 60 million, it is a substantial number
 some 7-10% of the total  in a tribal group of some two to three hundred. It
is also necessary, according to Keeley, to take note of the fact that large-scale
formal battles of the kind which play a part in the wars of ‘civilized’ peoples,
tend to take place less frequently in ‘primitive’ war than small raids and
ambushes. These, says Keeley,
… have usually involved having a handful of men sneak into enemy territory
to kill one or a few people on an encounter basis or by means of some more
elaborate ambush. Women and children have been commonly killed in such
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raids … One common raiding technique (favoured by groups as diverse as the
Bering Straits Eskimo and the Mae Enga of New Guinea) consisted of quietly
surrounding enemy houses just before dawn and killing the occupants by
thrusting spears through the flimsy walls, shooting arrows through doorways
and smoke holes, or firing as the victims emerged after the structure had been
set afire (Keeley, 1996: 65).
Of course, the simple demonstration that primitive warfare is more openly
ferocious and, in a quantitative sense, more deadly than subscribers to the
Rousseauian view hold it to be, does not prove anything regarding the
contention that it is their contact with Western civilization that has made the
so-called ‘primitive’ peoples warlike and violent. ‘Barbarization’ as a result of
contact with the West has, of course, in all probability happened not
infrequently. However, despite this evident fact, not only have Chagnon, Eibl-
Eibesfeldt and Wrangham and Peterson cast doubt on it as shown in my
earlier discussion but Keeley has, in my opinion, decisively refuted it. He has
done so because, as an archaeologist, he has succeeded in proving conclusively
that pre-state tribal peoples from all over the world engaged in violent warfare
before both the modern era and contact with the West. He also shows
conclusively that, whilst it may not be/have been totally universal, violent
warfare has frequently occurred amongst members of our species since the
earliest times. In the context of this paper, it must be enough to illustrate this
by quoting from Keeley’s conclusion. ‘The facts recovered by ethnographers
and archaeologists’, he writes:
… indicate unequivocally that primitive and prehistoric warfare was just as
terrible and effective as the historical and civilized version. War is hell whether
it is fought with wooden spears or napalm. Peaceful pre-state societies were very
rare; warfare between them was very frequent, and most adult men in such
groups saw combat repeatedly in a lifetime … (T)he very deadly raids,
ambushes, and surprise attacks on settlements were the forms of combat
preferred by tribal warriors to the less deadly but much more complicated
battles so important in civilized warfare. In fact, primitive warfare was much
more deadly than that conducted between civilized states because of the greater
frequency of combat and the more merciless way it was conducted … At the
tactical level, primitive warfare and its cousin, guerrilla warfare, have also been
superior to the civilized variety. It is civilized warfare that is stylized, ritualized
and relatively less dangerous. When soldiers clash with warriors (or guerrillas),
it is precisely these ‘decorative’ civilized tactics and paraphernalia that must be
abandoned by the former if they are to defeat the latter (Keeley, 1996: 174-175).
This reference to the need to abandon ‘civilized norms’ and ‘civilized’
forms of warfare in order to combat guerrilla fighters ties in with the American
experience in Vietnam, and more recently, with that of the Americans, British
and their allies in Iraq. But how, if ‘primitive’ and guerrilla warfare really are
as deadly and effective as Keeley maintains, have peoples who consider
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themselves to be ‘civilized’ managed regularly to conquer and colonize the pre-
state and tribal peoples whom they perceive as ‘barbaric’ and ‘primitive’?
According to Keeley, the answer is that, although they may lose particular
battles, the economic surpluses, population sizes, transportation technologies,
and the planning and logistical capabilities of ‘civilized’ peoples enable them
to win the war. In a word, ‘civilized’ peoples may become less good as fighters
but ‘civilization’ gives them the men, material and overall wherewithal to fight
long and sustained campaigns. Let me turn now to Bryan Turner’s (2003) essay
on ‘warrior charisma’.
8. Warrior Charisma and the Spiritualization of Violence
Bryan Turner’s stimulating and original essay is concerned in the first instance
with demonstrating that, in his study of ‘civilizing processes’, Norbert Elias
‘almost completely neglected the historical and comparative nature of
religious culture, the sacred, the priesthood and the Church in the history of
western society’ (Turner, 2003: 96). The idea that Elias neglected religion is
not a new one. Franz Borkenau (1937, 1939) made basically the same point
in his reviews of the first two German volumes of The Civilizing Process, as
did Martin Albrow (1969) in his review of the first English translation of
Volume I. This recurring contention is not, of course, entirely wrong.
However, it is not so much the case that Elias neglected religion as that he
treated the beliefs of the adherents to its various forms as one power resource
among others and as a major ‘means of ruling in the priest-dominated first
civilizations with their low levels of reality-congruent, scientific under -
standing relative to our own’ (Goudsblom in Goudsblom, Jones and Mennell,
1989). Elias also conceptualized religion as a ‘means of orientation’ and dealt
with it in Involvement and Detachment (1987) as one of the major forms of
‘magical-mythical’ thinking, i.e. of thinking with a relatively high affective
content, coupled with a relatively low level of ‘object adequacy’ or ‘reality
congruence’. Nevertheless, he never sought to deny the power and
significance of religious institutions and beliefs.
More important for present purposes, however, is the fact that Bryan Turner
seems to be unaware of Johan Goudsblom’s (2003) important distinction
between the ‘Augustinian’ and the ‘Lucretian’ traditions of approaching the
understanding of religion. According to Goudsblom:
The Augustinian and the Lucretian traditions view the civilizing process from
opposite angles. This leads to different impressions, with different emphases.
If the Augustinian tradition overestimates the importance of religion in the
civilizing process, the Lucretian tradition contains an anti-clerical sting that
may bring about underestimation. There can be no doubt that what we now
classify as religious forces have at times exerted a strong pressure towards
socially induced self-restraint. That pressure should be seen, however, in the
context of wider social and ecological pressures. Whatever influence religion
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has had was always subject to historical circumstances. Religion was never the
sole civilizing factor. And in many instances it gave impetus to decivilizing
spurts such as crusades, persecutions, civil war and, as it has come to be called
in our own days, ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Goudsblom, 2003: 36).
The fact that Bryan Turner seems to be unfamiliar with Goudsblom’s
measured and balanced case does not, in my opinion, detract from the force of
his (Turner’s) data-based central argument. This is concerned with the
implications of the warrior practices of the American ‘Plains Indians’, especially
the Cheyenne, for Elias’s theory. The first thing worthy of note in this
connection is that Turner does not fall for the ‘myth of the peaceful savage’ but
presents instead an open and honest account of Plains Indian warrior charisma
and warrior violence in all their, seen from the standpoint of the hegemonic
‘civilized’ values of present-day Western societies, ‘ferocity, ‘savagery’ and raw
lack of ‘civilized decorum’. Turner phrases his problems thus:
Among the American Plains Indians, … warrior charisma was associated with
transitions to manhood status where tribal rites of passage produced experiences
of possession, trance and vision. Charisma erupts into human society, albeit in
the context of religious rituals and institutions of liminal transition. The his-
torical transformation of warrior charisma is thus an important challenge to the
general validity of the thesis of a civilizing process. While the training of the
knight inculcates norms of bodily deportment, uprightness and chivalrous dis-
positions, shaking, convulsive and vibrating bodies mark the presence of charis-
ma. Do the civilizing process and the elimination of the warrior require the
 suppression of such primitive forms of psychogenesis? (Turner, 2003: 99).
Whilst I would cavil at this latter-day functionalist reification which
conceptualizes a ‘blind process’ as having a ‘requirement’, my answer to this
question is an emphatic ‘yes’: the suppression of warriors by means of
‘courtization’ (Verhöflichung) and in other ways, and the long-term subjection
of warriors to civilian control, processes which can be, of course, and invariably
are, reversed for greater or lesser periods of time, are important components of
a ‘civilizing process’. In raising this question and drawing attention to warrior
charisma, Bryan Turner has pointed to ways in which Elias’s studies of the
warriors of medieval Europe and their transformations could be usefully
supplemented. I think, too, that Turner adds to our understanding of ‘civilizing
processes’ in the USA when he refers to Rojek’s (2001) study of ‘celebrity’.
According to Turner, the ‘extraordinary’ Plains Indian warriors of the 1870s,
… Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Red Cloud, Little Big Man and Dull Knife 
became legends of the encounter between civilization and savagery. As a result,
the Cheyenne and Sioux were rapidly drawn into the emerging entertainment
culture of modern society. Warriors who had terrified white settlers in the
1870s became figures in popular culture by the 1880s. We might say that
 warrior charisma was eventually transformed by photography, the stage and
film, into celebrity (Turner, 2003: 102).
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I have only one more criticism to offer. This is that Turner fails to mention
the part played by the use of tobacco and other drugs in Native American ritual
and warfare (Hughes, 2003). Let me turn now to the subject of modern war.
9. Some Figurational Reflections on Modern War
The first thing worthy of note in this connection is that Norbert Elias shared the
largely left-wing hatred of and horror over war. However, he also expressed
revulsion regarding those on the left who glorify ‘revolution’ because, he said,
‘revolutions’ are a kind of war. That is, they, too, tend to involve people killing
each other and lead to multiple unintended and often violent consequences.
However, Elias was not by any means a pacifist. Violence, he argued, is necessary
when, for example, a ruling group or ‘establishment’ and an ascendant group such
as a class, ethnic group or hitherto subordinate gender become trapped in a
‘frozen clinch’ because the ruling group refuses to make concessions (Elias, 1969).
There is also at least one sense in which the belief that the twentieth
century witnessed a trend towards growing violence is based on solid
foundations. More particularly, as an accompaniment of the increasing pace
and scope of global social change, the 20th century was the first in which wars
that were literally ‘world wars’ took place. It was also a century in which the
violence and effectiveness of the technology of mass destruction increased to
hitherto unprecedented levels, a fact evidenced above all in nuclear weapons
and the weaponry of chemical and germ warfare. The capacity to produce and
deliver such weapons is, of course, a consequence of the application of
advancing scientific knowledge and that, in its turn, is arguably in part a
consequence of a ‘civilizing process’. More particularly, one aspect of a
‘civilizing process’ involves an advance in people’s capacity for self-distanciation
(Elias, 1984) and this enables them to move beyond highly involved, magical-
mythical views of the world towards perspectives that are more detached,
more ‘reality-congruent’ and facilitate greater control. In order to appreciate
this, of course, a relatively detached approach is required of the reader.
The ability to exercise a high level of self-control, another consequence of
a ‘civilizing process’, is also necessary in order to use many complex modern
weapons. Further to this, a lot of modern warfare involves killing at a distance
through the firing of rockets and the dropping of bombs on people whom one
cannot see or hear. People who consider themselves to be ‘civilized’, do not, for
the most part, like the blood and gore of face-to-face battles and have to
undergo training that amounts to a process of ‘decivilizing’ in order to be
prepared for battle. Such individuals and those who are ‘de-civilized’ by the
direct experience of war, often represent a threat to their societies of some
magnitude when peace returns. The problems caused by Korean and Vietnam
veterans in the USA are one example (Joas, 2003: 111ff ).
It is also important to note that there have been numerous violent and
destructive wars since 1945. However, they have been, for the most part, local
in scope, restricted, with the recent exceptions of the wars associated with the
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break-up of former Yugoslavia and the former USSR, mainly to Third World,
formerly colonial countries. Without for one moment wishing to detract from
the tragic reality of these wars for the people most directly involved, to say
nothing of the often horrific aftermath of, for example, unexploded landmines,
it is nevertheless arguably relevant to point out that many areas of the world,
particularly in the West, have enjoyed hitherto unprecedented levels of peace
and prosperity since the end of World War Two. Such peace and prosperity
cannot, of course, be understood independently of the forms of neo-colonial
domination and exploitation that derive from the power differentials that are
inherent in our rapidly globalizing world. Writing in the late 1980s, just
before the end of the ‘Cold War’, Norbert Elias commented on this peace,
though not the prosperity, as follows: He wrote:
When the problem of physical violence is examined it is often asked how it is
possible that people strike or kill others so that they become, for example, male
or female terrorists. It would be more … productive, if the question were
posed differently. It should go: How is it possible that so many people can
normally live together peacefully without fear of being struck or killed by
stronger parties  as peacefully as is generally the case in the great state-
regulated societies of contemporary Europe, America, China or Russia? It is
often forgotten that never before in the development of humankind have so
many millions of people lived together so peacefully  that is, with the
considerable elimination of physical violence  as in the large states and cities
of our time. This becomes evident only when one realizes how much more
violent and how much higher in risk of physical attacks were earlier epochs of
human development (Elias, in Keane, 1988: 178).
Elias wrote this years before the so-called ‘war on terror’ declared by the
second President Bush. The ‘male or female terrorists’ he (Elias) primarily had
in mind were groups such as the ‘Red Brigade’ and the ‘Baader-Meinhof ’
group. They saw themselves as anti-fascist and cannot be understood
independently of the culture, politics and tensions of the ‘Cold War’ era. Bush’s
‘war on terror’ was post-Cold War, more international and partly rooted, firstly
in the ‘First World/’Third World’ division and the First World’s dependency on
and greed for oil, and secondly, in a latter-day flaring up of the Christianity-
Islam conflict that started in the Middle Ages. That is, the combatants on both
sides, and more particularly some of their leaders, are adherents to monotheistic
forms of magical-mythical thinking, though one side  the Christian side  is
generally more powerful, somewhat more secular and more technically
advanced. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ was also arguably based more on a politically
and mass-media driven mis-reading and highly emotional perceptual
magnification of the levels of danger involved than it was on a massive
escalation of the levels of violence and danger per se. Of course, this might well
change if the ‘terrorists’ and religious fundamentalists, whether Christian or
Moslem, from the West or from the East, were to succeed in getting their hands
on weapons of mass destruction. That is because the present indications are that
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they would not hesitate to use them9. I am thinking of Bush and Blair and those
under their command in this connection and not simply of Moslem terrorists
or of their more direct counterparts in the West such as the Baader-Meinhof
group or the Irish Republican Army.
A world state with a legitimacy comparable to that of the most successful
Western nation-states and based, like them, on interdependent monopolies of
violence and taxation has not yet emerged and perhaps never will. That is
because nuclear and germ weapons, with their immense destructive power,
presumably spell an end to processes of state-formation involving violent
elimination struggles of the kind which Elias showed were involved in the
‘civilizing’ of Western Europe. If such weapons were to be used all-out,
humanity would destroy itself or at least propel us into some kind of post-
nuclear dark ages. If that happened, ‘post-modernity’ in a literal sense would
really well and truly have arrived! In a word, the formation of a world state, if
it occurs, is likely to be both more long-term and more peaceful in the sense
of not involving direct recourse to the use of the most destructive weapons
except as a threat. If these weapons do not remain ‘confined to barracks’, it may
spell the end of humankind. Assuming that such a version of ‘Armageddon’
does not occur, perhaps what is happening in Europe at the moment with the
development of the EU may be a precedent for what may happen on a world
level in the future? To express it metaphorically and metaphysically, ‘only time
will tell’. Let me turn now to the subject of genocide.
10. Genocide in the Process of Civilization
The first thing worthy of note in this connection is the fact that ‘genocide’ has
come in recent years to be a contested and perhaps overused concept. That is
why I have enclosed the term in inverted commas in this essay. What it literally
refers to is an attempt, usually by a more powerful group, intentionally to
eradicate entirely a group of less powerful people whom they socially define as
a ‘race’. For example, even though in this case an attempt to control and exploit
was arguably more consciously involved than an attempt to exterminate, D.E.
Stannard (1992) has referred to the large-scale wiping out of ‘Native Americans’
in the course of the conquest of the ‘New Word’ by people of European descent
as not only a ‘genocide’ but also as ‘the American Holocaust’. This latter usage
is debatable. Another contested example is the definition as a ‘genocide’ of the
massacre of one and a half million Armenians by Turks in the course of the First
World War and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire (Brannigan and Cassis in
Levinson (ed.), Vol 1, 2002: 769-76). Perhaps also problematic is the definition
as a ‘genocide’ of the killing of some two million opponents by Pol Pot and the
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Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the 1970s (Power, 2002: 86-154). Both of these
cases involved ‘massacres’ but they were politically/ideologically motivated and
whether they involved racial and exterminationist intent is dubious. So would
be application of the term ‘genocide’ to the millions who died as a more or less
direct consequence of Stalin’s policies in the former Soviet Union.
The killing in Rwanda in April 1994 of some 800,000 people of mainly
Tutsi descent by Hutus, as well as several earlier comparable events in the
country and its colonial predecessors, was far less unambiguously a ‘genocide’.
It was, that is to say, an intentional, racism-motivated massacre aimed at
eliminating an entire group (Power, 2002: 328-389). Another involving tribal
peoples and in which Western colonists were only indirectly involved, if at all,
might be the extermination of the Owugeo tribe by the Cheyenne which
Moore (1999: 113, cited in Turner, 2003: 102) described as a ‘tribal genocide’.
Two more relatively unambiguous examples which Alison Palmer (1994)
described as ‘colonial genocides’ were the killing off of ‘Aborigines’ in
Queensland, Australia by people of British descent, and the racist massacre by
German soldiers during the First World War of the Hereroes of South West
Africa (see also Richard J. Evans, 2003: 12).
However, without doubt the most unambiguous ‘genocide’ of modern
times has been the Nazi ‘Holocaust’. It is certainly the best documented and,
despite the malignant efforts of the so-called ‘Holocaust deniers’ (Lipstadt,
1993), there can be no reasonable doubt about it having occurred or having been
a ‘genocide’, that is, an attempt to eradicate entirely a whole group of people
(the Jews) whom the Nazis socially defined as a ‘race’ in the sense of attribut-
ing to them a constellation of bio-genetically determined traits.
It is arguably fair to say that a widespread attribute in the twentieth century
to the unspeakably horrific fact of ‘genocide’ involves the idea that it is
specifically and entirely modern as a social phenomenon. A more sophisticated
version of the same belief is the idea that the Nazi attempt to exterminate the
Jews was specifically modern because it was dependent on such features of
‘modernity’ as bureaucratic organization and industrial technology, an idea
most recently propounded by Zygmunt Bauman (1984)10. From a figurational
standpoint, however, although ‘modernity’ has probably helped to increase the
scale and efficiency of ‘genocides’, it is not so much ‘genocide’ per se that is
specifically modern as the growth of revulsion against it. That, at any rate, was
the view of Norbert Elias. Writing not only of the Holocaust but also of the
more general violence of the Germans toward conquered groups during the
Second World War, he suggested that, in the twentieth century:
… the mass slaughter of conquered groups by the German Nazis … aroused
almost world-wide revulsion … The shock was all the greater because many
people had lived under the illusion that, in the twentieth century, such
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barbarities could no longer happen. They tacitly assumed that men had
become more ‘civilized’, that they had become ‘morally better’ as part of their
nature. They had taken pride in being less savage than their forefathers or than
other peoples … without ever facing up to the problem which their own
relatively more civilized behaviour posed  to the problem of why … their
behaviour and their feelings had become a little more civilized. The Nazi
episode served as a kind of warning; it was a reminder that the restraints
against violence are not symptoms of the superiority of the nature of ‘civilized’
nations, not eternal characteristics of their racial or ethnic make-up, but
aspects of a specific type of social development which has resulted in more
differentiated and stable social control of the means of violence and in a
corresponding type of conscience-formation. Evidently, this type of social
development can be reversed … (Elias in Dunning [ed.] 1971: 106-107; and
in Elias and Dunning, 1986: 143)
Elias went on to contend that the almost universal feeling of repugnance
against ‘genocide’ witnessed in the twentieth century indicates that human
societies have undergone a ‘civilizing process’, including a widening in the
range of peoples’ identification as fellow humans of groups who are linguisti-
cally, culturally and phenotypically different from themselves, ‘however  limited
in scope and unstable’ the results of this process turn out to be. This is shown
among other ways, he suggested, by comparison with the Ancient world. More
particularly, according to Elias:
In Greek and Roman antiquity, the massacre of the whole male population of
a defeated and conquered city and the sale into slavery of its women and
children, though they might have aroused pity, did not arouse widespread
condemnation. Our sources are incomplete but, they show that cases of mass
slaughter recurred with fair regularity through the whole period. Sometimes
the battle fury of a long threatened or frustrated army played its part in the
wholesale massacre of enemies. The destruction of all the Sybarites they could
lay their hands on by the citizens of Croton under the leadership of Milon, the
famous wrestler, is a case in point. Sometimes, ‘genocide’ was a calculated act
aimed at destroying the military power of a rival state. The wholesale
destruction of all men of Argos as a potential rival of Sparta is an example. The
massacre of the male population of Melos by order of the Athenian Assembly
of citizens in 415 … resulted from a configuration very similar to that which
led to the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 … (T)he Athenians
killed the men, sold the women and children into slavery, and settled the island
with Athenian colonists. Some Greeks regarded war as the normal relationship
between city-states. It could be interrupted by treaties of limited duration.
Gods, through the mouths of their priests and writers, might disapprove of
massacres of this kind. But the level of ‘moral repugnance’ against what we
now call ‘genocide’ and, more generally, the level of internalized inhibitions
against physical violence, were decidedly lower, the feelings of guilt or shame
associated with such inhibitions decidedly weaker than they are in the
relatively developed industrial nation-states of the twentieth century. (Elias in
Dunning (ed.), 1971: 107f; and in Elias and Dunning, 1986: 144-f ).
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It would not, I think, be too much of an exaggeration to suggest that the
historical record, not only of the Ancient world but also before and since, is
littered with examples of massacres and ‘genocides’. In fact, the killing of people
perceived as enemies, whether on realistic grounds or not, could even be said
to involve a kind and degree of ‘rationality’ as far as peoples living at or near a
subsistence step and without a money economy are concerned. Elias suggested
as much when he wrote of the ruling class in early feudal Europe that:
Outbursts of cruelty did not exclude one from social life. … The pleasure in
killing and torturing others … was a socially permitted pleasure. To a certain
extent, the social structure even pushed its members in this direction, making
it seem necessary and practically advantageous to behave in this way. What,
for example, ought to be done with prisoners? There was little money in this
society. With regard to prisoners who could pay and who, moreover, were
members of one’s own class, one exercised some degree of restraint. But the
others? To keep them meant to feed them. To return them meant to enhance
the wealth and fighting power of the enemy. For subjects (i.e. working, serving
and fighting hands) were a part of the wealth of the ruling class … So prisoners
were killed or sent back so mutilated that they were unfitted for war service
and work (Elias, 2000: 163).
Elias’s reference here to killing and torturing others as a ‘socially permitted
pleasure’ points to an often overlooked feature of ‘genocides’, massacres,
murders and many other forms of violence, namely the socially acceptable, to
a degree even licensed ‘hunting of humans’ (Leyton, 1986) or what one might
call ‘genocide as play’. If I understand him, Slavoj Zizek came close to using
such a concept in his critique of Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1996). Zizek wrote:
Goldhagen’s insistence that the executioners, as a rule, did not feel any ‘shame’
about what they were doing is … misplaced: his point, of course, is that this
absence of shame proves the extent to which their torturing and killing of Jews
was integrated into their ideological awareness as totally acceptable. A close
reading of the testimonials of his own book nonetheless demonstrates how the
executioners experienced their deeds as a kind of ‘transgressive’ activity, as a
kind of pseudo-Bakhtinian ‘carnivalesque’ activity in which the constraints of
‘normal’ everyday life were momentarily suspended  it was precisely this ‘trans-
gressive’ character … which accounted for the ‘surplus enjoyment’ one got from
excessively torturing the victims. The feeling of shame thus … in no way proves
that the executioners were ‘not wholly corrupted’, that ‘a minimum of decen-
cy persisted in them’: on the contrary, this shame was the unmistakeable sign of
the excess of enjoyment they got from their acts (Zizek, 1997: 57).
Although it misses the fact that this ‘carnivalesque’ behaviour was condemned
as ‘un-German’ by such leading Nazis as Heinrich Himmler and Auschwitz
Kommandant Rudolf Hoess, Zizek’s point is well taken (Hoess, 1959). That is,
the Nazi Holocaust was far from just being the rational-bureaucratic and, in that
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sense, ‘modern’ ‘genocide’ depicted by Zygmunt Bauman (1984), although that
was part of it. Indeed, as Elias (1996) has shown, also involved was a ‘breakdown
of civilization’ on several levels. It is also sometimes argued that the mass slaughter
of (mainly) Jews in gas chambers and gas vans from 1942 onwards was decided
upon and planned at the Wannsee Conference in Berlin in the January of that
year, and that it replaced shooting and other forms of killing because it was less
uncomfortable for the killers (see, e.g., Roseman, 2002; and Goldhagen, 1996:
157). This is implausible. The Wannsee Conference was more concerned with
facilitating and systematizing a planned process that had begun with the 
invasion of Poland in 1939 and was already under way. The Einsatztruppen/
Einsatzkommandos and the Ordnungspolizei had already shot some 2 million by
the time the Wannsee Conference took place. Few of the killers showed signs of
revulsion or regret. Nor did the death camp, labour camp and concentration
camp guards. Gassing was introduced largely as a more efficient supplement, but
the shootings never stopped, to say nothing of the ‘death marches’ of 1944 and
later (Goldhagen, 1996). Moreover, while there is some evidence that some of the
killers (Goldhagen, loc cit) had breakdowns, they remained comparatively rare
whether the killers were Germans, Poles, Lithuanians or whatever. And the idea
that the gas chamber technology was somehow more impersonal than shooting
is also not quite right. Some victims resisted entry or fought to have their children
left outside (Hoess, 1959: 149f). In any case, the killers had to look through the
windows to see whether or not the victims were dead. The screams and death
cries of the latter were also clearly audible to those outside, even in some of the
neighbouring blocks.
Hans Joas is critical of Bauman on a related issue, more particularly for
not paying sufficient attention to ‘the role of spontaneous and individual vio-
lence in the everyday life of the concentration camps’ (Joas, 2003: 166). Joas
also shares with Elias the idea that there is a need, contra Bauman, to stress
that the Holocaust took place during the war (Joas, 2003: 168; Elias, 1996:
311). Let me now turn to the issues of crime, punishment and sport. I shall
deal with them together and fairly briefly.
11. Aspects of Crime, Punishment and Sport
in the ‘Civilizing’ of the West
It may seem strange to some that I should think it relevant to include in this
discussion of ostensibly ‘serious’ subjects such as war, ‘genocide’, crime and
punishment, a consideration of the apparently ‘trivial’ subject of sport.
However, just as it is arguably the case that forms of sport can be involved in
‘genocidal’ acts, war, punishment and crime, it is also the case that serious
violence and crime of varying degrees and forms can be accompaniments of
sport and play. Sport has also visibly risen in the hierarchies of socio-cultural,
socio-economic and socio-political significance in recent years, and similar
‘civilizing/de-civilizing’ trends are arguably evident in all these fields as well.
Let me try to demonstrate this with regard to crime and punishment.
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Although it does not seem to have filtered through yet into mainstream
criminology and the sociology of crime, both of which tend to remain pre-
dominantly present-centred, there is a growing consensus among historians
of the subject that rates of violence fell in Western countries more or less con-
tinuously from the end of the Middle Ages until the 1960s/1970s. In a com-
prehensive review of the literature which serves as a prelude to a demonstration
of how such a pattern generally fits the Irish case, Irish criminologist Ian
O’Donnell cogently summarizes the trend as follows:
The evolution of modern societies is characterized by ever-decreasing levels of
lethal violence between individuals. In a detailed … review of historical and
contemporary sources, Gurr described how homicide trends could generally
be seen to describe ‘a distended U-shaped curve’. By this he meant that levels
of homicide declined steadily from the early nineteenth century, before
beginning an upward surge in the 1960s. This upswing was sustained until the
late 1970s, when Gurr completed his analysis. The pattern of a nineteenth
century decline was found wherever data had been collected. Deviations from
the downward trend were temporary and accounted for by the aftermath of
war, demographic changes, economic prosperity or decline, and the early
stages of rapid urbanization and industrialization. The increase since the
1960s was common though not universal (O’Donnell, 2002: 56).
Looking at the problem from an even longer-term perspective, Gurr (1981:
296) described fourteenth century England as ‘a society in which men (but
rarely women) were easily provoked to violent anger and were unrestrained in
the brutality with which they attacked their opponents’. Commenting on
murder rates since the thirteenth century, Lawrence Stone concluded that: ‘It
looks as if the homicide rates in thirteenth century England were about twice
as high as those in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that those of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were some five to ten times higher than
those of today’ (Stone, 1983: 25).
In a recent review of relevant research in England, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Germany, Switzerland, Italy and the Scandinavian countries, Manuel Eisner
concluded that the apparent general trend is real and neither a methodologi-
cal artefact nor a consequence of inadequate data. He wrote:
The notorious imprecision of population data, deficiencies in the sources,
shifts in the legal definition of homicide, changes in the age structure as well
as improved medical possibilities, surely have to be accounted for. But the
evidence is so consistent, the secular decline so regular, and the differences in
levels so large, that it seems difficult to refuse the conclusion of a real and
notable decline (Eisner, 2001: 628).
In order to explain this ‘real and notable decline’, Eisner follows Gurr
(1989) in invoking Elias’s theory of civilizing processes. In fact, in arguing
thus these authors are part of an emerging consensus that Elias’s theory provides
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more explanatory purchase on the problem than either ‘modernization’ theo-
ries or the conventional explanations the roots of which are traceable to
Toennies, Durkheim and the Chicago School. In their The Civilization of
Crime (1996), for example, Eric A. Johnson and Eric H. Monkkonen point
to what they take to be four implications of Elias’s work that run counter to what
used to be hegemonic assumptions among historians and sociologists in the
1950s and 1960s and still are far from having lost their hold today. These
implications are that:
i) Emergent royal courts played a central part in the control of violent behav-
iour in developing Western nation-states in their early stages;
ii) Behaviour tends to be more ‘civilized’ in urban than in rural areas;
iii) Levels of impulsive violence tend to be higher among people in areas where
state systems have not yet penetrated; and
iv) In Western societies since the Middle Ages overall levels of violence have
declined.
Johnson and Monkkonen continue:
It is these and many other implications of Elias’s work that may have impeded
its acceptance … for what he said ran contrary to a different and more
persuasive theoretical sequence. This argument, originally associated with
classical sociological theorists such as Toennies and Durkheim, and later
elaborated on by Park and Burgess …, held that, with the breakdown of
family and community (Gemeinschaft) and the rise of mass society
(Gesellschaft), especially through urbanization, industrialization and the class
alignment of capitalist societies, crime has increased. Since crime did increase
somewhat (in America at least) following World War II, and dramatically
subsequent to 1968, this other line of sociological theory made much sense.
Elias’s discussions of the control of violent impulses in ‘civilized’ societies
seemed out of touch. So, for historians of crime, the slowly growing conviction
that crime has decreased, not increased, over the centuries; that the countryside
used to be dangerous, not safe; that, as Barbara Hanawalt put it, ‘fur-collar
crime’ was a major threat. All of this changed the status of Elias from curiosity
to prescient thinker (Johnson and Monkkonen, 1996: 4-5).
A similar picture holds regarding the punishment of crime. As Spierenburg
(1984), Pratt (2002), and, less unambiguously, Garland (1990) have shown,
pace Foucault (1986) the ‘civilizing’ of punishment in Western Europe was less
a relatively swift process associated with the decline of monarchy than a longer-
term process connected with state-formation and changing sensibilities at the level
of the social habitus of people. A study that we carried out in Leicester in the
1980s points in the same overall direction. Using Leicester’s local newspaper,
The Leicester Mercury, as our main source of data, we documented the fact that
the reported incidence of violence in Britain over the years 1900-1975 followed
a mainly downward trend. More particularly, the reported incidence was rela-
tively high before the First World War, fell between the wars, and increased
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after the Second World War, especially after the 1960s but without coming
anywhere near to approximating the levels of the years before 1914.
One of the innovative features of this study consisted of the fact that we dis-
tinguished between violence in four ‘spheres’: the ‘political sphere’; the ‘indus-
trial sphere’; the ‘community sphere’; and the ‘sphere of sport and leisure’. Criminal
violence per se was not part of our focus. What we found was: a generally down-
ward trend in the reported incidence of political violence in twentieth century
Britain; a trend regarding industrial violence that was broadly similar, except
that, in this case, the level of reported violence remained high up to the General
Strike of 1926; and a steady fall in the incidence of community violence. The
only sphere of British social life in which the reported incidence of violence rose
more or less steadily in the course of the twentieth century was sport and leisure.
What seems in effect to have happened is that a tradition of working class
street and pub fighting which was associated with ‘aggressive masculinity’ and
fighting had earlier been firmly established, began to decline as a result, for
example, of residential relocation, growing affluence, and the increasing
incorporation of working class people into dominant values. As this occurred,
the comparatively small number of males who continued to cling to the street
and pub fighting tradition came increasingly to use sport and leisure, and after
the mid-1960s especially soccer, as a context for expressing it. This invasion of
a national sport by working-class fighting gangs in a country which, up until
then, had prided itself and been widely acclaimed internationally for its peace-
loving sports spectators, was amplified by media reporting out of proportion to
what was actually occurring, contributing to the impression of a society where
law and order were on the verge of breaking down. However, if one takes the
whole picture into account, it is clear that, for most of the 20th century, the
reported — and probably also the factual — incidence of violence in Britain
had been falling and that the reported rise in and after the 1960s was relatively
slight. Even the increase of hooliganism in conjunction with football can be
largely accounted for as a kind of transfer of violent traditions into sport and
leisure from the community, pub and street. In a word, our findings are broadly
consistent with those of other researchers into long-term trends.
12. Conclusion: Trends in Violence and Elias’s Thesis
By way of conclusion, I want to suggest that, — and this slight criticism is in
no way intended to detract from the overall significance of their work — contra
Johnson and Monkkonen (1996), Elias saw ‘civilization’ as a ‘beginningless
process’ and nowhere claimed that, ‘over time, violence would decline’. In fact,
he saw the future as more open-ended and suggested that, at the present level
of knowledge, all we can do is investigate why particular past sequences rather
than plausible and possible others have occurred (Elias, 1978: 158ff ). We
cannot, however, predict the future and, although he was optimistic, Elias
certainly did not rule out the possibility of nuclear war as part of the process
of humans learning better ways of living together (Elias, 1991: 146).
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Ted Gurr (1981) was one of the first scholars to recognize that the reported
rise in violent crime in many Western countries since the 1960s/1970s is best
construed as supporting rather than refuting Elias. This increase, Gurr argues,
‘appears to be a minor perturbation, proportionately no greater than upward
swings in homicide rates in Elizabethan times and during the Napoleonic wars
— swings which proved to be temporary’. Each major ‘upsurge of violent
crime’, he suggests, has been a consequence of ‘fundamental social dislocation’.
Among other things, this has separated whole strata from ‘the civilizing
institutions which instil and reinforce the basic Western injunctions against
interpersonal violence’. These dislocating forces ‘may be migrants, demobilized
veterans, a growing population of disillusioned young people for whom there
is no social or economic niche, or badly educated young black men locked in
the decaying ghettos of an affluent society’. Gurr stresses in this connection that
‘the most devastating episodes of public disorder’ appear to coincide with
breakdowns of civilization, short-term ‘changes in values which legitimate
violence’, often transmitted through popular culture. For this reason, the
instability of lower working class families and the destruction of the compassion
institutionalised through the post-war welfare state in response to neo-liberal
demands may have long-term deleterious ‘de-civilizing’ repercussions. (Gurr,
1981: 338-340, 343, 346; see also Leyton, 1995: 251). This is a cogent
argument. In the present context, it is only necessary to add that the currently
accelerating processes of globalization which, because they are both causally and
consequentially associated with the current dominance of neo-liberal or ‘New
Right’ doctrines are fundamentally fuelling both the erosion of welfare states
and the trend towards increasing violence, may make this ‘de-civilizing’ trend
last longer than was the case in Elizabethan and Napoleonic times. Whether
this proves to be the case or not, if the analyses and arguments advanced in this
paper have any substance, an interpretation of Elias based on a close and
accurate reading of his central texts rather than on ideological or other forms
of mis-construal of what he wrote, provides us with a basis on which it will be
possible to increase our understanding of the structure and dynamics of
‘civilizing’, ’de-civilizing’ and ‘dys-civilizing’ processes beyond the level reached
so far. Hopefully, the typology, the data and the arguments and ‘tests’ of Elias
outlined in this paper will prove to be helpful in this connection.
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